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This is the first paper in estimating a population-averaged panel logit probability model to 
test the importance of the interaction between deficit in the public budgeting and income 
inequality on banking crises, for 36 developed countries from 1961-2011. New empirical 
evidence is shown on whether rising inequality is linked with financial crises, 
corroborating theoretical expectations of post-Keynesian authors. Policy measures are 
provided and tested empirically: whilst in general terms higher levels of income inequality 
could be associated with financial crises; countries with high levels could reduce the 
likelihood of a crisis better in a context of fiscal consolidation. One reason could be that 
governments could use this public surplus for reducing income inequality, which helps to 
reduce defaults and banking crises.  These results could be useful for academics, and 
policy-makers. 
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1   Introduction 
Many papers have analyzed the post-Keynesian view that considers the influence of inequality 
on financial crises (Raghuram Rajan, 2010; Michael Kumhof, Romain Rancière, and Pablo 
Winant, 2015; Karolin Kirschenmann, Tuomas Malinen, and Henri Nyberg, 2016; inter alia). 
Nonetheless, Salvatore Morelli, and Anthony B. Atkinson (2015, p.31) state that “the overall 
evidence is far from being conclusive and there are several reasons to shed further light on this 
important research topic.” In fact, none of them have empirically tested the impact of the 
interaction of income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, and public deficits as a 
determinant of banking crises in a panel logit model (Peña, 2016, 2017a). As far as known, this 
is the first paper in which, applying a panel logit model, income inequality and fiscal 
consolidation are interacted to study this issue.  
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The rest of the paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 provides the literature review, 
the definition of banking crises, the view of other schools about it and the determinants, 
consequences and policies for avoiding these crises. After having provided other angles, section 
3 develops the post-Keynesian hypothesis of the paper in contrast to other perspectives. Section 
4 explains data and methodology, using a multivariate logit panel data model and a System 
GMM to check it, whilst the empirical results are provided and discussed in Section 5. The main 
result of this section is the corroboration of the post-Keynesian view by a significant and robust 
positive impact of inequality on the likelihood of a banking crisis, jointly with the fact that 
fiscal consolidation is also beneficial for avoiding these crises. There is also contribution in 
policy measures, studying the impact of the interaction of income inequality and fiscal 
consolidation on banking crises. A negative sign of the coefficient of this variable is found, 
which gives a policy measure: establishing fiscal consolidation to reduce income inequality 
when a banking crisis starts. Finally, Section 6 provides conclusions, final remarks and further 
research. Additionally, there is an Appendix with other checks and estimations discarded by 
non-nest tests. 
2    Systemic Banking Crises 
First of all, it is required to provide a definition of systemic banking crisis (Dabrowski, Beyers 
and Villiers, 2016). A banking crisis could be defined as “the occurrence of simultaneous 
failures in the banking sector that significantly impairs the capital of the banking system as a 
whole, which mostly results in large economic effects and government intervention” (Lainà, 
Nyholm, and Sarlin, 2015), or as “a situation when more than half of the banking capital or at 
least a considerable share of the banking capital is lost” (Knutsen and Sjögren, 2009). 
Nonetheless, here we provide the definition of Laeven and Valencia (2020) for the update of 
the dependent variable employed in this paper. According to them, “we define a banking crisis 
as an event that meets two conditions: 1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or banking 
liquidations). 2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant 
losses in the baking system. We consider the first year that both criteria are met to be the year 
when the crisis became systemic.” 
After this definition, it is worth to separate the “banking crisis” from the “financial crisis”. 
The former is a kind of the latter. Financial crises can be divided in banking crises, currency 
crises and sovereign crises. The first two ones are usually considered twin crises because they 
coincide (Kauko, 2014), as in the Nordic (early 1990) and Spanish (late 1970 and early 1980) 
crises (Reinhart, 2002). Nonetheless, as Balteanu and Erce (2018) state, there are also times in 
which banking and sovereign crises are combined. 
According to the type of banking crisis, there are at least two types of banking crises 
regarding the evidence (Knutsen and Sjögren, 2009): insolvency crises as the crises in several 








developed countries during the 1980s and 1990s without relevant outbreaks of bank panic or 
depositor runs, with widespread credit losses that lead to high amounts of non-performing 
loans, causing losses of capital and insolvency. Second, a combination of loan losses and 
depositor runs, as the “Asian flu” in 1997 (Kauko, 2014) where failing monetary policy was 
the main explanatory factor of bank panics and the crisis. 
Now some prototype countries and their correspondent banking crises are going to be 
revised in order to see the main aspects that lead them to the brunt of the banking crises. First, 
it is worth to highlight the case of the Nordic countries, with the crises of Sweden (late 1870s), 
Norway (first half of 1920) and Finland (1990s), with the exception of Sweden. In all countries 
the banking crises were mainly driven by de-regulation and liberalization of the banking system 
in excess, encouraging the entrance of new banks and an excessive competition that put down 
their profitability. Some authors sustain that highly competitive markets lead to arise risking-
taking behaviors (Keeley, 1990), and that the monopoly power of banks is stabilizing (Noy, 
2004). Beck et al. (2006) obtain that more concentrated banking systems are less vulnerable 
than atomistic ones, after controlling with institutional variables such as financial openness and 
economic freedom. For this case of Nordic countries, Knutsen and Sjögren (2009) contribute 
with an explanation, stablishing that all banking crises are preceded by an institutional clash as 
the de-regulation of these countries, defined as “a substantial shift of the dominating 
macroeconomic policy attached to the financial system”. Excessive regulation could also lead 
to crises. 
Gavin and Hausmann (1998) provide further examples. According to them, previous 
countries also experienced an adverse terms-of-trade shock before to the bank crisis (with the 
exception of Sweden), in addition to being the origin of the cases of Spain (80s, 90s) and most 
Latin American crises. Other causes were the exposition to volatility of the asset prices, as 
precedent of the failure of many banks in Argentine in the early 1995 by the Tequila effect for 
being exposed to Mexican banks; a long period of exchange-rate overvaluation and high 
interests as before the Chilean crisis of 1982-1983 or unstable macroeconomic and financial 
policy that unchained the 1980 financial panic in Argentina.  
There are other policies that are involved in banking crises, for instance fiscal policy. Rising 
public expenditure while the currency is overvalued was the germen to the Tequila crisis at 
Mexico in 1995. Expansive fiscal and monetary policy led to a banking crisis. This kind of 
policies can also generate sovereign crises. But regarding banking crises, volatile fiscal policies 
can also hurt the banking system, generating destabilizing increases in the interest rates and, 
through the expectations of inflation, also unchaining fluctuations in deposit demand, as Gavin 
and Hausmann (1998) state. In addition, tax payers assume responsibility when the crash is 
large enough to require a bailout. This can also affect to income distribution, where savers can 
loss their savings and also have to pay more taxes, in contrast to high-income individuals that 
easily elude the tax system. In addition, tax elusion and avoidance could also deteriorate public 







accounts and lead the public sector to demand more public debt, sometimes provided by banks, 
and easing possible sovereign crises with the potential banking crisis. In Latin American 
countries there is plenty of corruption, tax avoidance and scarce economic freedom, which 
encourages banking crises. In general, fraud is a root of crises since lending can be used to 
circumvent regulation and there can be transfers of deposits to hold companies that are ruined, 
as occurred in the Turkish banking crisis of 2000 (Soral, İşcan and Hebb, 2006). According to 
Pereira et al. (2018), low level of GDP and high debt influence on banking crisis. Also during 
credit booms there could be higher income inequality because just before the outbreak of a 
crisis the economy grows at a speed higher than the average (Reinhart, 1999) and not always 
in the most pro-equality way. In fact, credit booms precede to most of the financial crises as in 
Argentina (1981), Chile (1981-82), Uruguay (1982), Colombia (1982-83), Norway (1987), 
Sweden (1991), Finland (1991-92), Japan (1992) and Mexico (1995), for citing some (Gavin 
and Hausmann, 1998).  
There are other crises of interest. For instance, low interest rates lead to the Japanese crisis 
in the 1990s, or the sub-prime crisis and the Lehmann-Brother bankruptcy, with origin in the 
USA, led to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in the late 2000s due to financial contagion and 
the consequent Great Recession (GR) in the earlies 2010s. Fell et al. (2018) have highlighted 
the importance on reducing the levels of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) in European countries 
(raised after the GFC and being currently at an average level of 3% at Europe (EBA; 2020)) in 
order to avoid the possible adverse impacts on financial intermediation. NPLs are “loans where 
the borrower - either a company or a physical person - is not able to repay a bank loan1.” 
The roots and causes of banking crises are several. They can be divided into policy, 
macroeconomic, banking and institutional origins. Regarding the determinants related to 
policy, Goldstein and Turner (1996) highlight the heavy involvement of the government and 
the loose of controls on connected lending, Gavin and Hausmann (1996) point the volatile fiscal 
policy as a source or incorrect monetary policy, as previously mentioned, highlighting the 
effects of money supply or the interest rates (Frankel and Saravelos, 2012). Large fiscal deficits 
can predict crises while central bank independency prevents them (Kauko, 2014). Laeven 
(2011) focuses on the role of government subsidized housing policies as a generator of real 
estate booms or the potential procyclicality of fair value accounting.  Respect to the 
macroeconomic factor, it is worth to highlight the macroeconomic volatility, external and 
domestic (Goldstein and Turner, 1996), terms of trade or world interest rates (Gavin and 
Hausmann, 1996), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), factors regarding current account, inflation, 
capital flows, external debt and financial openness (Frankel and Saravelos, 2012).  
Referring to the banking influences, lending booms, asset price collapses and surges in 
capital flows are relevant (Goldstein and Turner, 1996), as well as rising bank liabilities with 
 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/bg/MEMO_18_310  








large mismatches in maturity or in currency (Goldstein and Turner, 1996), serious credit 
crunches, bank leverage, illiquidity, presence of information problems, interaction between 
bank solvency and liquidity, the inefficient payment mechanism, protection of depositors, with 
the explicit government-provided deposit insurance, low quality and riskiness of the assets, the 
role of debtors and government in a bankruptcy (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996), equity returns 
or debt composition (Frankel and Saravelos, 2012), the banking sector-relevant structural 
factors, as the too-big-to-fail or excessive banking competition (Kauko, 2014). Finally, 
institutional causes could be, as Goldstein and Turner (1996) asserts, the inadequate preparation 
for financial liberalization, the weakness in the accounting, disclosure and legal framework, 
exchange rate regime or the distorted incentives for bank owners, managers, bank depositors 
and for supervisors. Additional institutional factors are the absence of an appropriate 
framework for bank supervision and regulation as in most cases of Latin America, the limits of 
banking regulation regarding costs, absence of the enough information by the authorities or the 
need of a transparent prudential regulation (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996), the deregulation and 
fraud as root of several banking failures (Laeven, 2011). 
The main consequences of banking crises are provided by Laeven (2011). These crises 
usually have real consequences, as decreasing output and employment, rising public debt, sharp 
decrease on the confidence in the banking system as a whole, losses from other (domestic or 
foreign) banks that were exposed to the bank fails, and losses in assets. There is also an 
immediate decline in the flow of credit to the real economy, unchaining and amplifying the 
negative effects to the borrower’s wealth with presence of asymmetric information. There are 
also income inequality effects as transfers from taxpayers to banks when an insolvent bank is 
recapitalized or from savers to creditors when there is inflation or currency depreciation as a 
consequence. 
For preventing or solving these crises, there are also certain policies. Addressing emerging 
liquidity loans, liquidity support, extensive guaranties on bank liabilities, bank holidays, 
regulatory capital forbearance, temporary assumption of executive powers by authorities, 
imposition of closes or merges with other financial institutions, workouts of distressed assets, 
restructure of debt or recapitalizations and nationalizations of banks are only some of the 
possible policies (Laeven, 2011). Other authors provide additional ones: reducing or living with 
uncertainty or volatility, adequate macroeconomic policies, reserve and variable capital 
requirements, supervisory tools (Goldstein and Turner, 1996 and Rathore, 2020) or improving 
the settled Value at Risk (VaR) models used in banking (Evangelos and Samitas, 2020). 
3    Development of Hypotheses 
Several economists consider that income inequality is correlated with financial crises (Rajan, 
2010; Robert B. Reich, 2010; Kumhof, Rancière and Winant, 2015; Kumhof et al., 2012; James 







K. Galbraith, 2012; Palley, Thomas I., 2012).2 The reason is given by Till Van Treeck (2014, 
p.1): 
 As the benefits of rising aggregate income over the past decades were confined to a rather 
small group of households at the top of the income distribution, the consumption of the lower 
and middle income groups was largely financed through rising credit rather than rising 
incomes. This process was facilitated by government action. 
These previous authors could be more or less related to Post-Keynesian school. Nonetheless, 
other authors find an insignificant relationship. In fact, other theories or thinking schools are 
not focused on inequality, sometimes even avoid involving in this topic. Regarding their view 
about banking crises, for instance, there is the theory of the efficient markets, where markets 
efficiently reflect the true prices of the products, showing all the information. The monetarist 
approach considers that banking crises are due to money, while the “business cycle school” 
links the crises to the business cycle. According to Knutsen and Sjögren (2009), mainstream 
considers problems related to the asymmetry in information combined with the presence of 
macroeconomic shocks, so there is a mixture of the previous two views. Laidler (2009) 
contrasts the monetarist approach that considers the excess of demand for money that the central 
bank has to relieve is a feature in banking crises, while later Wicksellian tradition sustains that 
central bankers have to avoid the intertemporal discoordination in the allocation of resources. 
On the other hand, Bianco and Sardoni (2018), shows the view of an additional school, the New 
Keynesian, who focus on the imperfections and frictions in the real sector and financial markets. 
In this case, income inequality could be considered as a friction in their view. 
Other authors consider banking crises provoke income inequality, and not the opposite. 
According to Atkinson and Morelli (2011), nowadays the relationship may work in the opposite 
direction. On the one hand, pressures for fiscal consolidation may encourage a constant 
decrease of the welfare state. On the other hand, for the authors the avoidance of banking crises 
may be necessary to warrant the sustainability of the social institutions we have developed to 
control inequality, the welfare state and the stability of the governance. Atkinson and Morelli 
(2011) find that higher income inequality seems not to precede banking crises, but they find 
more evidence on the opposite: income inequality is preceded by banking crises. Jesper Roine, 
Jonas Vlachos, and Daniel Waldenström (2009) use data during the period 1900-2000 for 16 
countries and they conclude that a financial crisis would reduce the top 1 percent income share 
by roughly 0.2 percentage points for each year of the crisis. The results of Michael D. Bordo, 
and Christopher M. Meissner (2012) suggest there is no significant relationship between 
inequality and credit booms. Using data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000, 
they obtain these are not general relationships. They find credit booms heighten the likelihood 
of a banking crisis. Nevertheless, they find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads 
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to credit booms. Instead, the only two robust determinants of credit booms in their data set are 
economic expansions and low interest rates. Hence, they do not find evidence for the inequality, 
credit, crisis nexus, but a traditional boom-bust pattern of reductions in interest rates, excessive 
growth, increasing credit, asset price booms and crises.  
First, this paper will check whether there is evidence that financial crises are preceded by 
income inequality, measured by the Gini index, and fiscal consolidation, in a separate way. 
Income inequality is considered because, as Luca Agnello, and Ricardo M. Sousa (2012, 
p.1425) state, “inequality increases before banking crisis episodes and sharply declines 
afterwards.” Being aware other determinants of financial crises, we follow the post-Keynesian 
view of considering inequality as a determinant of financial crises and formulate a theoretical 
hypothesis: 
H: “Income inequality and public deficits increase the risk of a banking crisis. A policy for 
reducing banking crises would be establishing public surplus for reducing income inequality 
when the crisis arrives. So, the interaction between fiscal consolidation, and income inequality 
lagged two years for reflecting the adaptation of income inequality thanks to the surplus, would 
reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis.”  
This last view would not be opposed to the New Keynesian view of the presence frictions, 
in this case the proposed policy would seek for eliminating a friction in the real sector, the 
interaction between sovereign deficit and income inequality. Previous-to-crisis surpluses would 
offset after-crisis deficits, maintaining the public budgeting balance in long term. From the 
monetarist and mainstream angle, this interaction can also be seen as a macroeconomic shock. 
According to the Wicksellian view, this can be a discoordination in the allocation of the 
resources that generates income inequality and crises; but could be solved by correctly 
employing a sovereign surplus. 
In addition, there are, at least, two main reasons for supporting this hypothesis. First, some 
authors have highlighted the importance of the expansion of credit on banking crises (Taylor, 
2009; Peña, 2017b) or the importance of tax policy (Peña, 2020). Nonetheless, fiscal 
consolidation and credit expansions are correlated (so, in the proposed econometric model, the 
latter variable will not appear), as Ağca and Igan (2019) show: higher fiscal consolidation turns 
into a cost of credit, overall for small businesses. So, fiscal consolidation could be considered 
a factor for reducing banking crises. On the other hand, public deficits, but also income 
inequality, lead to higher instability, due to temporary breaking the balance budgeting rule. 
Second, fiscal consolidation has distributional effects (so, income inequality will be lagged two 
periods in the model to clearly avoid multicorrelation, endogeneity and to show the higher 
income inequality previous to the fiscal consolidation) as Ball et al., (2013) show, therefore, 
the interaction between fiscal consolidation and income inequality lagged two years would 
reduce the risk of a banking crisis. 







Respect to the impact of income inequality on banking crises, jointly with the instability 
provoked by public deficits, is relevant to highlight that the higher the income inequality in a 
country, the less middle income people and the most lower income people would be, who could 
start to fall in credit default and encourage to a banking crisis.  
As Roy and Kemme (2012, p.274) suggest, “Consistent data on Gini ratios or other similar 
measures are not readily available” for datasets as the one of this paper. This may be a reason 
for, as far as known, nobody has ever estimated a panel logit probability model explanatory of 
banking crises using the Gini index and the public deficit interacted.  
4    Data Sample and Methodology 
Our dependent variable, crisis, is available in the World Bank and represents a dummy variable 
that is 1 if the country is experiencing a banking crisis and 0 if not. We estimate the equations 
using a population-averaged panel logit probability model, as Büyükkarabacak and Valev do 
(2010). logit 𝑃𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1|𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 𝛽∗𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙   (1) 
The dependent variable is crisis, itcontrol are the control and target variables, 
*β  the change 
in the logit of the proportion with 1crisis =  for a raise in control of a unit. 
Panel data is used, specifically, an unbalanced panel from the year 1961 to 2011 from 36 
countries, all the EU (27) and some of the OECD countries according to Table 1, which gives 
some basic information about data. 
The variable that represents income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, is lagged 
for two periods, in order to avoid reciprocity and simultaneity problems (Büyükkarabacak and 
Valev, 2010). The reason is that banking crises also impact on income inequality (Agnello and 
Sousa, 2012), as well as fiscal consolidation (Ball et al., 2013). The source of the data was the 
World Bank Database, except gini2, which comes from the databases of Eurostat and OECD, 
and distance, from the GeoDist Database (Thierry Mayer and Soledad Zignago, 2011).  
Table 1. Countries and Years in the Sample 
Years: 52 Countries: 36 
1961-2011 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Latvia, Mexico, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 








Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
crisis 1836 0.083 0.276 0 1 
balance 1632 -0.348 6.548 -34.68 32.268 
terms 1527 7.04E+11 6.09E+12 -3.58E+13 6.97E+13 
exch 1489 87.256 237.406 0.00001 1909.439 
surplus 575 -1.546 4.351 -29.42 20.01 
lerner 535 0.185 0.118 -1.609 0.503 
dist 1,872 9.844 0.25 9.653 10.670 
gini2 428 29.43 10.22 0.283 56.210 
 
Table 3 shows each variable with its respective source, and the expected sign of the coefficients 
of the control and target variables, as well as its references, based on the arguments of Sections 
1 and 7. The effect of surplusgini2 on the dependent variable will be discovered empirically 
and discussed theoretically in Section 6. 
Correlations among independent variables used in the model are shown in Table 4. 
Variables with a high correlation are not included in the models and hence, in the matrix. Some 
variables were omitted due to a high correlation with other variables. Avoiding these variables, 
the highest one is the correlation between dist and gini2, with a value of 0.3. This correlation is 
below 0.5, so it does not seem to be multicollinearity problems. In spite of that, a VIF test has 
checked the presence of this problem among these variables and the results indicate these 
variables are far from multicollinearity. 
Table 3. Expected Signs of the Variable Coefficients. 
Variable Source Sign References 
balance World Bank + Rose and Spiegel (2010, 2011) and 
Stockhammer (2013) 
terms World Bank + Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1999) 
exch World Bank - Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1999) 
surplus World Bank
World Bank 
- Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) 
lerner World Bank + Beck et al. (2006) 
dist  Mayer and 
Zignago (2011)
- Ye and Han (2010) 
gini2 OECD and 
Eurostat databases
+ Stockhammer (2013) and Wisman 
(2013)
 







Table 4. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
 
balance terms exch surplus lerner dist gini2 
balance 1   
terms 0.011 1   
exch 0.132 0.101 1   
surplus 0.23 0.107 0.058 1   
lerner -0.169 0.042 0.039 0.197 1   
dist -0.278 -0.044 0.144 -0.243 0.18 1  
gini2 -0.011 -0.054 0.218 0.035 0.035 0.305 1 
 
 
The variables are described as follows. The variable crisis is the dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if there is a systemic banking crisis or 0 otherwise, the variable terms shows the terms 
of trade of the country defined as the capacity to import less exports of goods and services, exch 
reflects the exchange trade of a country, the variable surplus is the cash surplus (if it is positive) 
or deficit (if it is negative) of the government of a country, lerner is the degree of concentration 
of a banking system measured by the Lerner index, dist is the logarithm of the geographical 
distance of a country to the countries France, the USA and Japan that are economic potencies, 
measuring the avoidance of the contagion effect. Finally, gini2 is the degree of income 
inequality measured by the Gini index and lagged two years in order to avoid possible 
correlation, simultaneously and endogeneity problems. This variable is made using the Eurostat 
source for European countries and the OECD source for the rest. 
The estimation procedure is as follows. First, a general model with the main variables 
regarding policy, macroeconomic and banking, and institutional factors was developed 
(including more than the variables of Table 2, see the Appendix). Nonetheless, there were too 
many variables for achieving convergence in the model and enough robustness, so a first 
division was needed to be made. Three kinds of models were developed, all of them starting 
with the target variables surplus, gini2 and their interaction. In addition, for each of the three 
models were chosen policy, macro and banking, and institutional variables, respectively, 
mainly understanding policy variables as those that the public sector could manage in the short 
run by developing direct or indirect policies, and institutional factors as those of the long run. 
Macroeconomic and banking variables are those regarding the specific characteristics of the 
economy of the country or the banks.  
Once this is done for logit models, the next step is to sequentially eliminate from the model 
the variables with less significativity, until all the coefficients have a p-value of 0.15 or less, 
obtaining a reduced logit model. After that, and in order to avoid potential endogeneity bias, to 
dynamize and to robustly check the econometric specification of the previous models, System 








GMM models are estimated. After this, the same sequence of variable-elimination is performed 
until a final model is obtained. Next, a logit model with the same explanatory variables as this 
final model is estimated, and there will be a test of non-nested models by checking the AIC and 
BIC tests, which are compared between these models and their correspondent previous reduced 
logit (obtained by eliminating non-significant variables starting from the logit model with all 
the variables of the same type). Therefore, a “finalist” model is obtained by choosing the one 
with the lowest AIC and BIC for each logit models of the same type of determinants of banking 
crises. 
Following, there is an estimation of a logit model with all the variables of the reduced logit 
models (finalists or not) in order to apply the same eliminating-procedure and to obtain a 
reduced logit model based on an initial logit model with the full significant explanatory 
variables of the other models. There is also a GMM System estimation by the same procedure 
and giving the specification to an additional reduced logit model. As previously, the reduced 
logit model with the lowest AIC and BIC indicators is chosen as finalist. 
Finally, among the finalists a definitive model will be chosen between the four finalist 
models (among the three finalists for each kind of determinant and the one parting from the full 
logit model with all the significant main variables) according to their AIC and BIC. To the non-
reduced form of this definitive model (meaning the initial logit model without making the 
eliminating-procedure) there will be included as explanatory two additional variables in order 
to introduce dynamicity and to check the robustness of the results: a variable made by any lag 
of the dependent variable and geographical variables, giving the “complete” model. The 
eliminating-procedure will be applied to this model, leading to the second definitive model. 
Finally, the AIC and BIC indicators will be compared from the complete and two definitive 
models in order to obtain the chosen specification of the model. These last models will be 
exposed in the next section, while the other models and some other results will be shown in the 
Appendix. 
5    Empirical Results, Discussion, and Policy Measures 
The main results are found in Table 5 (p-value in italics below coefficient), showing the impacts 
of the target and control variables on the probability of a banking crisis. Model (I) is the 
definitive logit model estimated, and has good econometric properties, as joint significance of 
the parameters, based on a p-value of the Wald test that equals to zero. Model (II) is the 
robustness check model, which also have good statistical properties. Both the signs and the 
amount of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal or similar in both models. In 
Models I and II, the post-Keynesian thesis3 that inequality increases the risk of a banking crisis 
 
3 This seems to be the most interested school in the influence of income inequality on banking crises. 







is assessed, jointly with the impact of fiscal consolidation alone. Model (II) was estimated on 
the base of model (I), consecutively eliminating non-significant variables to obtain a simpler 
and more explanatory model, and keeping interest variables in the successive estimations.  
Table 5. Definitive Estimated Models. 
crisis (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
laga 
  
  2.8*** 2.303***
 0 0 
balance 
  
0.185** 0.209** 0.174** 0.209** 0.058 0.167**
0.014 0.04 0.039 0.042 0.277 0.010
terms 
  
9.72E-14* 7.9E-14* 9.67E-15   
0.075 0.081 0.798   
ex 
  
-0.004** -0.005* -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004**
0.036 0.055 0.169 0.111 0.349 0.049
surplus 
  
-0.2** -0.215*** 0.61 0.58*   
0.019 0 0.119 0.068   
lerner 
  
-4.332 -5.522 -4.416   
0.252 0.192 0.243   
dist 
  
-0.557** -0.609*** -0.442*** -0.564*** -0.589*** -0.547***
0.001 0 0 0 0 0 
gini2 
  
0.131*** 0.120*** 0.096** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.09***
0.010 0 0.011 0 0.007 0 
surplusgini2 
  
  -0.025** -0.007*** -0.023** -0.006***
  0.042 0 0.032 0.001
core b 
  
  1.419*   
  0.064   
No 
observations 167 198 167 198 167 198 
No groups 28 29 28 29 28 29
AICc 123.04 145.614 119.574 145.249 108.346 132.902
BICc 144.866 165.343 144.519 164.979 139.526 155.92
Wald 107.38 40.13 102.14 43.09 286.46 99.83
Wald p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* Significance level of less than 10%, ** significance level of less than 5%, *** 
significance level of less than 1%. 
a: In the logit model it has only been possible to use lags of two periods due to the lack 
of convergence with one period. 
b: Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Finland.  
c: For obtaining the corresponding AIC and BIC estimators, it has been necessary to 
estimate the equivalent model in random effects. 








As seen in the models, income inequality is correlated with the triggering of a banking crisis in 
a statistically significant and robust way, confirming the post-Keynesian view3 of Stockhammer 
(2013) and others. Part of the hypothesis of Section 3 is also corroborated. All variables with a 
robust and significant effect on the likelihood of a financial crisis have the expected sign: the 
external balance, with a positive sign, because raising the external balance is a reaction to a 
potentially paralyzed demand. This result is coherent with Rose and Spiegel (2010, 2011) and 
Stockhammer (2013). The sign of the coefficient of the terms of trade variable is positive and 
the exchange rate is associated to a coefficient with negative sign (that is, the adverse terms of 
trade and a shock appreciation of the national currency are associated with a banking crisis), as 
Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1999) find. The prediction of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) that fiscal deficit provokes financial crises is corroborated, as well as another part of 
hypothesis of Section 3. As Section 3 also shows, first, fiscal deficit involves postponing 
measures to strengthen bank balance sheets and is an impediment to successful financial 
liberalization, which creates problems for banks. Second, a failure to control the budget deficit 
is an impediment to successful financial liberalization, which creates problems for banks. The 
lack of banking competition is obtained with a negative coefficient, in contrast to Gavin and 
Haussmann (1996) expectations, but it is not statistically significant. The variable dist, which 
reflects the geographical distance of a country to France, the USA and Japan, reduces the 
likelihood of a banking crisis, as Ye and Han (2010) expected. A nearer distance reflects higher 
risk of contagion of banking crises. 
Taking into account the results of the paper, it is important to consider the following policies 
in order to avoid the risk of a banking crisis. For instance, is there any measure of fiscal 
consolidation related with the level of income inequality? Above we saw that the fiscal 
consolidation is a general rule to avoid banking crises. Nevertheless, we want to know whether 
it is always true or it depends on the level of inequality. To answer this question, in Model (III) 
the variable surplusgini2 is incorporated to Model (I) in order to find the impact of the 
interaction of income inequality and fiscal consolidation on the probability of a banking crisis. 
Finally, Model (IV) allows a robustness check of Model (III) by consecutively eliminating non-
significant variables on the base of Model (III) and keeping interest variables in the successive 
estimations in order to obtain a simpler model and to check robustness. Model (V) checks the 
results by including a lag of the dependent variable by adding dynamicity and avoiding 
endogeneity, and also a geographical dummy variable, core, which considers countries where 
among them there have been crises the last decades (Nordic countries). Model (VI) is obtained 
reducing the previous one.  
A robust and significant negative impact of the interaction term on the likelihood of a 
banking crisis is observed and a no significant impact of the variable surplus alone. This can 
be interpreted as follows: fiscal consolidation policies in order to avoid financial crises are more 
effective in countries with high income inequality than in the other ones. One reason can be  







that governments could use this surplus to face income inequality, reducing the likelihood of 
banking crises.  
On the one hand, the no significant sign of the coefficient surplus alone show that fiscal 
consolidation per se does not seem to reduce the likelihood of banking crises. On the other 
hand, the negative sign of the interaction coefficient indicates that a fiscal consolidation in a 
lower income inequality country provokes a lower reduction of the crisis risk than in a higher 
one with the same level of surplus and ceteris paribus.  
Another reason could be that households of countries with high income inequality are also 
highly indebted (Aldo Barba and Massimo Pivetti, 2009). Hence, high income inequality 
countries have to prevent more than low income inequality countries from possible banking 
crashes due to bad debts. If fiscal consolidation is settled, banks with bad debts would be more 
easily rescued by the governments, and then the probability of a crisis would be reduced. This 
paper is also based on Leonard E. Burman et al. (2010) and others, who state that the fears of 
investors about future deficits (due to households’ bad debts, in this case) can trigger a financial 
crisis. Jesús Ferreiro et al. (2016, p.213) shows a kind of policy rule when they state: 
Any strategy of fiscal policy, mainly those focused on the correction of the fiscal 
disequilibria, must take into account the origin of these disequilibria […] and the evolution in 
the short and medium-term of the rest of budgetary items in order to design the correct intensity 
of the fiscal consolidation (or impulse) measures.  
Taking this into account, the tax administration of high-income inequality countries might 
reduce income inequality in order to avoid that fiscal deficits may harm the economy in the 
future. Both high levels of income inequality and fiscal deficits provoke banking crises. In the 
case of a low-income inequality country, fiscal deficit seems to lead to almost no financial crisis 
risk, being a positive and statistically but no economic significant impact due to its low 
magnitude. In this case, fiscal policies could be focused in other additional issues. 
6    Concluding Remarks and Further Research  
This paper analyzes the impact of inequality on banking crunches and provides policy measures 
related with fiscal consolidation to decrease the risk of banking crises. Using a large sample of 
countries and years, a robust significance of the positive influence of the interaction of public 
deficit and income inequality on banking crises is found, corroborating previous theoretical 
frameworks and arguments of the post-Keynesianism and others. The contributions of the paper 
are the following. First, a positive impact of inequality and public deficit, separately, on banking 
crises is obtained by the estimation of a population-averaged panel logit probability model. 
Second, policy measures useful for law- and policy-makers are provided. Countries with high 
levels of income inequality might increase the budget surplus to avoid crises, or reduce the level 
of inequality allowing so future fiscal deficits with almost no impact on financial crises; whilst 
in economies with low levels of income inequality, fiscal consolidation seems to produce no 








economic effect on banking crisis. The reason may be that households of countries with high 
income inequality are also highly indebted, and fiscal consolidation is necessary for prevent 
from possible banking crashes due to defaults and bad debts, and to rescue banks before a 
banking crisis starts. 
Further research would include topics that overweight the purpose of this paper but would 
also be interesting. For instance, using an alternative dependent variable, GDP, to check not 
only the correlation with the target variables, but also the Granger-causality. Another extension 
of this paper, which exceeds our target, was to check the independency of Central Banks by 
studying whether the impact of the interaction between public deficits and monetary policy, 
measured by the lending interest rate, is insignificant in the impact on credit loan expansions 
and GDP.  
Appendix: discarded econometric specifications and additional robustness 
checks 
In this appendix other specifications of the model are shown, used to check the robustness and 
consistency of the results, or discarded due to its lower explanatory power compared to the 
chosen models. In the checks there is also a check of the potential endogeneity of the dependent 
variable, dynamic estimations in GMM System in addition to the control of endogeneity and 
dynamicity of models (V, VI) of Table 5. Econometric models are estimated using the two-step 
System GMM method (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998). The main 
reason for choosing this methodology among others is the better treatment of the endogenous 
bias than other methods, its dynamicity and the efficiency of its estimators. The specification 
of the GMM models is as follows: 
 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 , = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 , + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 , + 𝜀 ,   (2) 
Where i=1,…, N and t=1,…, T; where T=52 is the total of temporal periods, the total of 
countries is N=35, the dependent variable is the same as the other models, control now can also 
include macro and banking variables and institutional factors, alpha and beta are the coefficients 
of the variables,   ,i tε  is the error term. The previous models were designed considering mainly 
policy measures, i.e.: variables that the government could modify in a relative short term, while 
institutional factors can be modified by the authorities in the long term, and finally, the macro 
and banking factors are less manageable for the policymakers. 
Main characteristics of the variables are summarized in Table 6. The new variables are 
obtained from the World Bank Data4, with the exceptions of publicdebt, from the IMF database, 
 
 
4 https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx  







Table 6. Summary Statistics of the Additional Variables Included in the Appendix 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
gdppcgr 1587 2.651 3.630 -31.178 17.557 
lnc2 1485 24.927 2.348 18.612 31.198 
capital 440 7.077 2.455 2.700 17.400 
liquidity 425 7.839 9.143 0.230 60.943 
inflation 1518 11.162 39.335 -4.480 1058.374 
lexpect 1869 70.397 5.262 43.244 87.700 
depend 1872 54.615 9.780 37.107 101.792 
instq 490 1.26E+00 4.16E-01 -1.15E-01 2.08E+00 
rulelaw 504 1.177 0.644 -0.759 2.000 
corruption 504 1.197 0.859 -0.820 2.586 
publicdebt 1518 48.741 34.883 1.717 289.554 
directtax 577 26.992 12.929 6.425 66.715 
NPLs 192 4.605 4.833 0.082 24.988 
core 1872 0.222 0.416 0.000 1.000 
 
and are composed by gdppcgr, which is the rate of growth of the per capita GDP in percentage, 
lnc2, which is the credit provided by the financial sector to the rest of the private sector, 
expressed in logarithm and lagged to year to avoid potential simultaneously and endogenously 
problems. The variable capital is the ratio of bank capital to assets and shows the share of bank 
capital and reserves to total assets expressed in percentage, variable liquidity is the ratio of bank 
liquid reserves over total bank assets, the variable inflation is measured as the consumer price 
index. The previous variables are considered as macroeconomic and banking country-specific 
variables. The variable NPLs are the bank nonperforming loans over the total of gross loans in 
percentage. 
The variable core includes countries with very tight fiscal schedules. Regarding the 
institutional variables, lexpect is the life expectancy at birth of males measured in years, the 
variable depend is the age dependency ratio, measured as the proportion of dependents (people 
younger than 15or older than 64) over the total working-age population (people between 15-
64). The variable instq is the index of regulatory quality and captures “perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development”. It ranges from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. The variable 
corruption is the control of corruption index and measures “perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests”. It also ranges roughly from -2.5 








to 2.5. The variable publicdebt is the public debt over GDP and is the gross general government 
debt to GDP expressed in percentage. Finally, the directtax variable reflects the taxes on 
income, profits and capital gains as percentage of revenue. 
Table 7 shows the two System GMM models estimated for the above variables, i.e.: the policy 
factors, the first one with all the variables and the second one is the reduced model after the 
eliminating-procedure. Finally, Model (III) is the same as (II) but estimated in static logit 
model. Finally, the variable NPLs has been regressed in level and with lags, but this variable 
Table 7. Additional Models with Policy Factors and NPLs 
crisis (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
lag 0.736*** 0.699*** 0.733*** 0.726***
  0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
balance -0.001         
  0.767         
terms -5.91E-15         
  0.471         
ex 0.0002         
  0.547         
surplus 0.095* 0.088*** 0.109     
  0.074 0.008 0.74     
lerner -1.045*** -1.381*** -0.599     
  0.000 0.000 0.818     
dist -0.026         
  0.418         
gini2 0.018* 0.016*** -0.061***     
  0.083 0 0.001     
surplusgini2 -0.003* -0.003*** -0.013     
  0.076 0.009 0.174     
NPLs       -0.004   
        0.421   
NPLs t-1         -0.004 
          0.288 
No observations 167 264 264 188 188 
No groups 28 34 34 31 31 
AICa     258.589     
BICa     276.469     
Sargan (p-value) 0.132 0.929       
A-B (p-value order 1/2) 0/0.754 0/0.933       
No of instruments 80 93   65 71 
R2 0.1437 0.1558   0 0.012 
Wald 238.67 727.86 45.08     
Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000     







has only a few observations and provoked problems in the estimations, furthermore, its 
significativity and explanatory power was low as Models (IV) and (V) show. 
Next, Tables are 8 and 9 where the country specific (banking and macro) and institutional 
factors are included as explanatory variables, respectively. In Table 10 the “complete” or “final” 
model using all the significant variables of the previous reduced models are included jointly. 
Models (I) and (II) of each table are the respective GMM System models as in Table 7 but with 
the new independent variables, Model (III) is also the same model as (II) but estimated in logit, 
and Models (IV) and (V) are similar to the Models (III) and (IV) of Table 5, in which all the 
variables used initially for each table as factors are included (Models IV of Tables 8-10) and 
estimated in logit, while Models (V) are the reduced form of the previous one after the 
eliminating-procedure. 
Table 8. Models with Macro and Banking Factors  
crisis (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
lag 0.427*** 0.677***   
  0.000 0.000   
gdppcgr -0.013** -0.011*** -0.231*** -0.269*** -0.275*** 
  0.048 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 
lnc2 0.006 -0.0208811 -0.058*** 
  0.548 0.518** 0.000 
capital -0.0490 0.010   
  0.169 0.935   
surplus 0.096** 0.048 0.108 -0.346 -0.183*** 
  0.022 0.093 0.285 0.309 0.000 
liquidity 0.011 -0.057   
  0.317 0.211   
inflation 0.038*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.042   
  0.000 0.046 0.000 0.660   
gini2 0.015 0.006 -0.038*** -0.013   
  0.129 0.002 0.000 0.680***   
surplusgini2 -0.004*** -0.002 -0.009** 0.004   
  0.007 0.098 0.013 0.704   
No observations 204 297 297 204 521 
No groups 29 35 35 29 36 
AICa   264.197 192.535 386.024 
BICa   286.36 228.295 403.047 
Sargan (p-value) 0.333 0.905   
A-B (p-value order 0/0.595 0/0.58   
No of instruments 77 100   
R2 0.4374 0.2425   
Wald 831.63 2218.47 197.87 45.86 136.51 
Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 








Table 9. Models with Institutional Factors  






lexpect 0.005 -0.037 -0.030**  






instq 0.2058 -2.715** -2.201** 
0.394 0.044 0.018 
rulelaw 0.354 0.613*** 0.430 4.192** 3.703** 
0.314 0.002 0.716 0.029 0.041 
corruptcontrol -0.544*** -0.400** -1.236 -1.907* -1.746* 





surplus 0.072** 0.084** -0.177 -0.255 -0.293*** 
0.025 0.012 0.627 0.461 0.000 
gini2 0.004 -0.012 
0.687 0.745
surplusgini2 -0.002* -0.003** -0.001 0.000
0.053 0.022 0.948 0.977
core 0.981 1.824** 1.905***  
0.269 0.010 0.000 
No observations 251 254 258 251 412 
No groups 33 34 34 33 35 
AICa 271.542 252.6962 336.656 
BICa 289.307 295.02 364.803 
Sargan (p-value) 0.9593 0.999
A-B (p-value order 
1/2) 
0/0.885 0/0.981 
No of instruments 88 85
R2 0.464 0.2492
Wald 1442.64 1673.97 15.87 71.61 104.56 














Table 10. Models with Final Factors Among Other Models After the Eliminating-Procedure 











instq -0.1478346 4.628 -1.174***  
0.588 0.201 0.000 
rulelaw 0.611*** 0.632*** 3.508** 4.192779 
0.036 0.000 0.025 0.150
corruptcontrol -0.397*** -0.444*** -3.659** -4.688*** 
0.002 0.000 0.011 0.000
gdppcgr -0.013*** -0.010** -0.119 -0.206 -0.267** 
0.003 0.010 0.238 0.175 0.001 
lnc2 -0.003 0.412
0.951 0.116
inflation 0.027* 0.018* 0.045 0.181
0.070 0.060 0.390 0.222
balance 0.011* 0.010* 0.102** 0.279*** 0.063*** 
0.079 0.059 0.043 0.009 0.002 
ex -0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.011* -0.001
0.362 0.000 0.054 0.269
surplus 0.094 0.111** -0.148 0.544
0.105 0.019 0.611 0.242
gini2 0.013 0.112** 
0.305 0.033
 
surplusgini2 -0.002 -0.003* 0.004 -0.020 -0.007***  
0.216 0.057 0.645 0.165 0.000 
core 0.593 2.61*** 0.962* 
0.396 0.000 0.080 
No observations 149 156 156 149 254 
No groups 24 25 25 24 33 
AICa 119.107 102.660 223.948 
BICa 146.556 144.716 245.172 
Sargan (p-value) 0.9113 0.9705
A-B (p-value order 
1/2) 
0/ 0.6729 0/0.4223 
crisis (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
No of instruments 75 75  
R2 0.335 0.3117  
Wald 1.75E+06 10114.56 14.38 217.23 59.63 
Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 








From the previous models, it is worth to mention that the Arellano-Bond (A-B) test has only 
been possible to be estimated with the correspondent model in GMM in differences and the R2 
is obtained from the correspondent static pool Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. In 
addition, it is well known that logit models are one of the best models in predicting crises. Table 
11 presents the non-nest test of the estimated models, showing the AIC and BIC of the “finalist” 
models (i.e.: the logit model of each kind of factors, including the final or complete models, 
with the lowest indicators for each type of variables), in order to show why the chosen model 
and presented in Section 5 is the definitive. As this Table shows, the Model (III) of Table 5 is 
chosen because of its highest explanatory power among the other models. Going further, Model 
(V) of Table 5, based on the previous model but with the inclusion of additional variables, 
shows the lowest indicator among all the models (AIC=108, BIC=140). 
While Model 10(III) presented lower AIC than in Model 5(V), the last model was chosen 
because of its lower BIC and less number of explanatory variables than 10(III) and also than 
the rest of models. Finally, in the definitive Model (V) of Table 5 there is an additional test in 
order to ensure that there is no evidence of endogeneity. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) 
test5 is performed to check it. This test consists on performing an additional specification 
including the potential endogenous variables (in this case, to check if surplusgini2 and crisis 
 
Table 11. Summary of the Explanatory Power of the Models 
Model 5(III) 8(IV) 9(IV) 
Table 5 8 9 
Factors Policy Macro and 
banks
Institutional 
AIC 119.574 192.535 252.696 
BIC 144.519 228.295 295.020 
No of explanatory variables 8 8 11 
Model 10(III) 5(III) 5(V) 
Table 10 5 5 
Factors Mixture Chosen model Augmented chosen model 
(definitive) 
AIC 102.660 119.574 108.346 
BIC 144.716 144.519 139.526 
No of explanatory variables 13 8 10 
 
5 https://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/durbin-wu-hausman-test/  







present endogenous behavior) and the residuals of the model, and regress them to another 
variable as dependent. If the coefficient of the residues is significantly distinct from zero, then 
there is evidence of endogeneity. The DWH test gives the following result for the Model (V) 
of Table 5, a Chi of 0.59 and a p-value of 0.4424, then the residuals are not significantly distinct 
from zero, and then this suggests that there is not endogeneity bias. Furthermore, the same 
Model (V) has been estimated but with an instrumental variables probit model, which compare 
the full sample with the potential endogenous variable (the instrumented variable) with the 
reduced sample with the instruments, and checks whether the instrumented variable was really 
endogenous. The lending interest rate is used as instrumental variable because of its 
significative correlation with the instrumented variable (surplusgini2), obtaining a Wald test of 
the exogeneity of the instrumented variable as null hypothesis with a p-value of higher than 0.6, 
accepting the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of surplusgini2  In addition, other specifications 
have been tried to use, but due to the insignificantly change of the results; they have been 
avoided to expose. Some examples include models with the interaction between income 
inequality and growth and tax variables, or the elimination of the core countries or the use of 
countries of the South of Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece). 
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